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A THEORY OF DISAGREEMENT IN REPEATED
GAMES WITH BARGAINING
BY DAVID A. MILLER AND JOEL WATSON1
This paper proposes a new approach to equilibrium selection in repeated games
with transfers, supposing that in each period the players bargain over how to play. Al-
though the bargaining phase is cheap talk (following a generalized alternating-offer
protocol), sharp predictions arise from three axioms. Two axioms allow the players to
meaningfully discuss whether to deviate from their plan; the third embodies a “the-
ory of disagreement”—that play under disagreement should not vary with the man-
ner in which bargaining broke down. Equilibria that satisfy these axioms exist for all
discount factors and are simple to construct; all equilibria generate the same welfare.
Optimal play under agreement generally requires suboptimal play under disagreement.
Whether patient players attain efficiency depends on both the stage game and the bar-
gaining protocol. The theory extends naturally to games with imperfect public monitor-
ing and heterogeneous discount factors, and yields new insights into classic relational
contracting questions.
KEYWORDS: Relational contracts, repeated games, self-enforcement, equilibrium
selection, bargaining, renegotiation, disagreement.
1. INTRODUCTION
MANY ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS (such as partnership, employment, and
buyer-supplier relationships) are ongoing and governed in whole or in part
by self-enforcement. The relational contracts literature studies these relation-
ships using the framework of infinitely repeated games, but repeated games
suffer from a vast multitude of equilibria, particularly when players are pa-
tient. So equilibrium theory alone offers little hope for predicting behavior or
for identifying parameters from observed behavior.
To understand these ongoing relationships, one needs a theory of equilib-
rium selection. Informally, it seems that players in an ongoing relationship
must coordinate closely so as to select “their” equilibrium from the multitude,
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so it often makes sense to suppose that they coordinate on a Pareto-optimal
equilibrium. But this intuition raises two issues. First, payoffs on the Pareto
frontier may be supported by the threat of punishments that depart from the
Pareto frontier. What if the players can re-coordinate their continuation play
to escape from a Pareto-dominated punishment? Second, there are typically
many equilibria on the Pareto frontier, where one player’s gain is necessarily
a loss for others. How do they decide which Pareto-optimal equilibrium to se-
lect? Though these issues have arisen in the relational contracts literature, a
unified solution is lacking.2
We resolve these issues by modeling equilibrium selection as a noncoop-
erative bargaining process embedded in a repeated game with transfers. In
each period, the players engage in cheap-talk bargaining via a generalized
alternating-offer protocol and make voluntary transfers prior to playing the
stage game. We propose three axioms that endow cheap-talk messages with
endogenous meaning. Any equilibrium that satisfies these axioms—which we
call a contractual equilibrium—has a simple representation. In a contractual
equilibrium, the bargaining protocol influences both the welfare level (the sum
of the players’ payoffs) and the distribution of welfare. These implications have
a simple interpretation in terms of relative bargaining power.
We provide an explicit algorithm for constructing contractual equilibria, and
we characterize their efficiency and allocative properties. We also extend the
theory to games with more than two players, imperfect public monitoring, and
heterogeneous discount factors. To demonstrate the utility of contractual equi-
librium for the study of relational contracts, we show how the theory generates
new insights in two principal-agent applications. We discuss how our theory re-
lates to findings in the empirical macro labor literature and the experimental
literature on preplay communication, bargaining, and repeated games. In par-
ticular, our results suggest that it may be fruitful for both literatures to explore
the role of bargaining power in more depth.
Axioms on Endogenous Meaning
Section 3 describes our axioms and Section 4 gives them a dynamic program-
ming representation. The first axiom, Internal Agreement Consistency (IAC),
ensures that a class of “agreements” has meaning. Specifically, if a player pro-
poses playing as if to switch to a different history in the same equilibrium and
if this offer is accepted, then the players play as agreed. By itself, IAC does
not change the set of equilibrium payoffs in the game (Theorem 1). A de-
viant agreement to switch histories can always be discouraged by punishing the
player who proposes it and rewarding the one who rejects it.
2There is also the renegotiation-proofness literature, which addresses the first issue, but gen-
erally not the second. We discuss renegotiation proofness later in this section and in more depth
in Section 8.
DISAGREEMENT IN REPEATED GAMES 2305
The second axiom, No-Fault Disagreement (NFD), embodies a theory of dis-
agreement. It specifies that if the players do not reach agreement in a given pe-
riod, then their continuation play should not depend on how bargaining broke
down. The idea is that no player should be selectively punished for putting an
innovative offer on the table or for rejecting the equilibrium offer in hopes of
being able to make an innovative counteroffer. Disagreement also implies zero
monetary transfers in the current period, which is equivalent to saying that
failure to make an agreed-upon transfer induces disagreement. NFD allows
continuation play under disagreement to be Pareto dominated by continuation
play under agreement, and it may vary with the past history of actions. By it-
self, NFD has little influence over the set of equilibrium payoffs in the game
(Theorem 2).
Putting IAC and NFD together, however, leads to a significant refinement
with a simple representation (Theorem 3(i)). For any given history, the bar-
gaining phase has a well-defined disagreement value and, in equilibrium, the
players divide the surplus according to the allocation of bargaining power that
arises from the bargaining protocol. Across periods, agreement and disagree-
ment values are linked by enforceability conditions along the lines of Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990). The set of equilibrium payoffs available under
IAC and NFD is typically much smaller than the set of all subgame-perfect
equilibrium payoffs. For instance, in some prisoners’ dilemma games, the only
possible outcome is infinite repetition of the stage-game equilibrium, regard-
less of how patient the players are (see Section 5.4).
Generally, there may be multiple, Pareto-ranked payoff sets available un-
der IAC and NFD. The third axiom, Pareto External Agreement Consistency
(PEAC), formalizes the intuition that players should be expected to select a
Pareto-optimal equilibrium. It ensures meaning for any agreement to play as if
switching to an equilibrium that both fully Pareto dominates the current equilib-
rium and also satisfies IAC and NFD. Under IAC, NFD, and PEAC, the play-
ers agree to play a fully Pareto-dominant subgame-perfect equilibrium among
those that satisfy IAC and NFD (Theorem 3(ii)).
Characterization of Contractual Equilibrium
In Section 5, we characterize the set of contractual equilibrium values. The-
orem 4 shows that, for any discount factor, this set is a compact line segment
of slope −1. Theorem 5 provides an explicit algorithm for constructing it. The
algorithm involves computing two optimal disagreement points that pin down
the endpoints, along with an optimal agreement outcome that determines the
players’ welfare. Theorem 6 provides necessary and sufficient conditions for
patient players to attain efficiency. We show that the allocation of bargaining
power affects welfare and that welfare is maximized by assigning all bargain-
ing power to one of the players (Theorem 7). Section 6 generalizes contractual
equilibrium to games with more than two players, imperfect public monitoring,
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and heterogeneous discount factors. Theorem 8 shows that the set of contrac-
tual equilibrium values forms a nonempty, compact hyperpolygon.
Foundations for Relational Contracts
The relational contracts literature examines how agreements can be self-
enforced in environments with repeated play and limited external enforce-
ment. Existing approaches have produced many insights, but mostly skirt
around the question of how agents initiate and manage their relationships.3
These assumptions simplify analysis, but leave open the implications of bar-
gaining power and how self-enforced agreements evolve after deviations.
Section 7.1 illustrates our approach by applying it to the principal-agent
model studied by Levin (2003). Levin applied “strong optimality,” a variant
of renegotiation proofness that, in this model, implies that the principal can-
not make a meaningful deviant offer to the agent, even if she has a monopoly
over making proposals. In contrast, in our approach, bargaining power mat-
ters: the agent’s effort is increasing in his own bargaining power. Surprisingly,
the principal’s ideal level of bargaining power is intermediate: if she has all
the bargaining power, she cannot commit to payments that would motivate the
agent; if she has no bargaining power, then the agent extracts all the surplus.
In Section 7.2, we apply contractual equilibrium to the interaction of “ex-
plicit” (externally enforced) contracts and “implicit” (self-enforced) contracts,
inspired by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) and related work by Schmidt
and Schnitzer (1995). These papers assume that parties are limited to external
enforcement following any deviation, implying that an improvement in exter-
nal enforcement can reduce equilibrium welfare. In contractual equilibrium,
the parties can reevaluate their entire relationship whenever they bargain, so
equilibrium welfare always weakly increases in the strength of external enforce-
ment. In Section 7.3, we discuss how the framework developed here can help
extend macro labor models to combine moral hazard, bargaining power, and
3Most approaches simply select an equilibrium on the Pareto frontier (e.g., Radner (1985),
Ramey and Watson (1997, 2001), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998), Levin (2002, 2003), Doornik
(2006), Fuchs (2007), Rayo (2007), Chassang (2010)). Some assume that after a deviation, the
players renegotiate permanently to the optimal spot contract (e.g., Thomas and Worrall (1988),
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 2002), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), Kvaløy and Olsen
(2006, 2009), Hermalin, Li, and Naughton (2013)); Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) also
allowed reallocation of ownership rights. Others allowed for renegotiation once the relationship
is underway, but assume that disagreement causes the parties to separate or switch to a stage-
game equilibrium permanently (MacLeod and Malcomson (1998), Jackson and Palfrey (1998),
Ramey and Watson (2002)). A few employed renegotiation proofness (MacLeod and Malcom-
son (1989), Levin (2003)). Even those who allowed for continued interaction following disagree-
ment assumed that the players temporarily either receive an exogenous outside option (MacLeod
and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2002), Halac (2012), Fong and Li (2010, 2012)) or play an exoge-
nously selected stage Nash equilibrium (Raff and Schmidt (2000), Klimenko, Ramey, and Watson
(2008)).
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continued interaction under disagreement. We also discuss connections with
the empirical literature, where there are suggestive results that link differences
in relative bargaining power to productive outcomes.
Contrast With Renegotiation Proofness
The literature on renegotiation proofness in infinitely repeated games, ini-
tiated by Rubinstein (1980), Bernheim and Ray (1989), Farrell and Maskin
(1989), and Pearce (1987), addresses the problem of Pareto-dominated contin-
uation play by ruling it out. That is, for a given equilibrium, if the continuation
from any particular history is dominated by a qualified alternative, then the
equilibrium is removed from consideration. So unlike contractual equilibrium,
renegotiation proofness does not model renegotiation explicitly, so it does not
contemplate the possibility of disagreement. By capturing the effect of bargain-
ing power in a tractable way, contractual equilibrium yields substantively dif-
ferent testable implications about the players’ welfare than does renegotiation
proofness. Section 5.4 illustrates the comparison between these approaches
and Section 8 discusses their relationship in more depth.
2. REPEATED GAMES WITH BARGAINING
2.1. Extensive Form
Consider a repeated game augmented with cheap-talk bargaining and trans-
ferable utility. Formally, a two-player game in this class is defined by a stage
game 〈Au〉, a common discount factor δ ∈ (01), and a bargaining protocol
that we describe shortly. Here A≡A1 ×A2 is the space of action profiles and
u :A → R2 is the stage-game payoff function. We normalize the payoffs by
1−δ as is standard. Each period comprises four phases: (i) the public random-
ization phase, (ii) the bargaining phase, (iii) the transfer phase, and (iv) the
action phase. In the public randomization phase, the players observe an arbi-
trary public randomization device.4 In the transfer phase, the players simulta-
neously make voluntary, nonnegative monetary transfers; that is, each player
decides how much money to pay to the other, where money enters their utility
quasilinearly. In the action phase, the players play the stage game 〈Au〉. The
stage game can also include voluntary transfers that occur simultaneously with
other actions. There is no external enforcement of any kind.
In the bargaining phase, the players engage in a generalized alternating-offer
bargaining protocol. The number of potential rounds of bargaining may be
finite or infinite, but all these rounds occur in a mere instant, so bargaining
does not delay the later phases of the period. (If bargaining involved delay, it
4Such devices are standard in repeated games analysis (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
Here, the device should be viewed as having been constructed by the players in their process of
equilibrium selection.
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would not be cheap talk.) There is an exogenous random recognition process
ρ ∈ ({12})∞ that selects one of the players to make a verbal statement in
each round of bargaining, where ρi is the probability that player i is recog-
nized in round . The selected player—called the proposer—selects a proposal
from some language set L and this is observed by the other player, who is
called the responder. If the response is “yes,” indicating the responder’s accep-
tance, then the bargaining phase ends and the game proceeds to the transfer
phase. If the response is “no,” then bargaining may either break down or con-
tinue to another round. If bargaining breaks down, then play proceeds to the
transfer phase. Breakdown is triggered randomly by a process β ∈ [01]∞ with∏∞
=1(1 − β) = 0, where β is the probability that breakdown occurs after a
“no” response in bargaining round . Both the recognition process and the
breakdown process are invariant to the time period and the history; they de-
pend only on the round of bargaining within a period.
The languageL should be sufficiently large that each player can use it to pro-
pose to the other how to coordinate their continuation play.5 Specifically, we
assume that L contains the space of possible continuation payoff vectors from
the voluntary transfer phase, so that a proposal w ∈ R2 should be interpreted
as a suggestion to coordinate on play in the continuation game to achieve w as
the continuation value.
ASSUMPTION 1—Rich Language: It is the case that R2 ⊂L.
Next we develop some notation for histories. We start by describing out-
comes of the bargaining phase within a period. Suppose bargaining lasts 
rounds, at which point an offer is accepted or there is exogenous break-
down. Such an outcome is fully described by an element of ({12} × L) ×
{agreement, breakdown}, where, for each round of bargaining, {12} accounts
for the identity of the proposer and L accounts for the proposal. For the
first  − 1 rounds, the response was “no.” Then, for round , “agreement”
signifies that the last proposal was accepted, whereas “breakdown” signifies
that bargaining broke down. Thus the set of possible bargaining outcomes is
B ≡⋃∞=1({12} ×L) × {agreement, breakdown}.
The set of full-period histories, including the “null history,” is H≡⋃∞t=0(Ω×B×R+ ×R+ ×A)t , where Ω is the state space of the arbitrary public random-
ization device. Here the first R+ accounts for transfers from player 1 to player
2, and the second R+ accounts for transfers from player 2 to player 1. The net of
these transfers is summarized by a transfer vector in R20 ≡ {m ∈R2|m2 = −m1}.
5One might wish to assume that L contains descriptions of all continuation strategy profiles in
the game. However, since such a construction would be circular (strategies would specify history-
dependent statements in each negotiation phase, and these statements would include the descrip-
tion of an entire strategy profile), it would lead to a difficult technical issue regarding whether an
appropriate “universal language” exists.
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A history to the transfer phase is an element of H×Ω×B. A history to the action
phase is an element of H×Ω×B×R+ ×R+. A history to the transfer phase or
to the action phase is under agreement if the just-completed bargaining phase
ended with “agreement”; otherwise the history is under disagreement.
2.2. Recursive Characterization of Equilibrium Values
We characterize the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) payoffs by ex-
tending the recursive methods of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), work-
ing backward through the phases of a given period. Consider first the action
phase. Let ˆA be the set of probability distributions over A that are indepen-
dent across dimensions, that is, the set of mixed action profiles that can arise
from independent mixed actions for each player. In equilibrium, the mixed
action profile must constitute a Nash equilibrium, taking the players’ contin-
uation play from the following period as given. Formally, if g :A → R2 gives
the continuation value as a function of the realized action profile a ∈A and if
α ∈ ˆA is a Nash equilibrium of 〈A (1 − δ)u+ δg〉, then g enforces α. In this
case, the continuation value from the action phase is
w= (1 − δ)u(α)+ δg(α)
(1)
If W ⊂R2 is the set of feasible continuation values starting next period, then
the set of continuation values supported from the action phase of the current
period is
D(W ) ≡ {w ∈R2 ∣∣(2)
∃g :A→W and α ∈ ˆA




Define Di(W )≡⋃w∈D(W )[wi∞) and let D(W )≡D1(W )×D2(W ). The set of
continuation values supported from the transfer phase is
C(W ) ≡ {w ∈R2 ∣∣(3)
∃m ∈R20 and w′ ∈D(W )
s.t. w= (1 − δ)m+w′ and w ∈D(W )}

To understand how values in C(W ) can be achieved, consider any w, m, and
w′ that satisfy the conditions of Eq. (3). Without loss of generality, take the
case of m1 ≥ 0 so that player 2 is supposed to make a transfer to player 1.
Prescribe that player 2 make this transfer and then the players continue with
behavior to achieve w′ from the action phase. If player 2 does not make the
required transfer, then the players coordinate on behavior to achieve a value
2310 D. A. MILLER AND J. WATSON
w ∈D(W ) from the action phase, where w is selected so that w2 ≥w2. Clearly
the prescribed behavior is rational from the transfer phase.6
Operator C provides the basis for the recursive formulation of SPE payoffs.
Given a set of equilibria S, let V (S) be the set of continuation values attained
by S starting from any full-period history. When V is evaluated at a single-
ton set {s}, we call it the value set of s and abuse notation to write V (s). Let
SSPE be the set of all subgame-perfect equilibria of our model with bargaining.
From the construction above, it is clear that V (SSPE) is the largest fixed point of
coC(·), where co denotes the convex hull to account for public randomization
at the beginning of each period. Also observe that V (SSPE) is identical to the
set of subgame-perfect equilibrium payoffs in an otherwise identical game with
no bargaining phase, denoted V (SNB).7
3. AXIOMATIZATION OF ENDOGENOUS MEANING
So far, statements in L neither have any particular meaning nor impose any
constraints on the set of equilibrium payoffs. We next develop axioms that re-
fine the equilibrium set by imposing meaning in equilibrium. Our axioms are
in the spirit of equilibrium restrictions introduced by the literature on preplay
communication, as discussed in Section 8.
3.1. A Foundation for Meaningful Proposals
In an equilibrium s ∈ SSPE, the players recognize that any payoff in
C(coV (s)) is attainable from the transfer phase by randomizing over con-
tinuation values achieved by s using the public randomization device at the
beginning of the next period. We posit that the players should have the oppor-
tunity to agree on such a payoff and then follow through on their agreement;
that is, any proposal to play as if conditionally switching to different histories in
the same equilibrium should be taken seriously. Our first axiom requires that,
on or off the equilibrium path, if there is agreement on a continuation value
w that is consistent with the equilibrium strategy profile (the proposer offers
w ∈ C(coV (s)) and the responder says “yes”), then the players proceed in a
way that achieves value w.
6Nothing more can be supported since feasibility requires w= (1 − δ)m+w′ for some m ∈R20
and w′ ∈D(W ), and each player i can guarantee himself some value in Di(W ) by making a zero
transfer. Also note that it is not helpful to have both players make positive transfers—one could
reduce both transfers equally until one equals zero, loosening the incentive constraints without
affecting the continuation value. For more details, see Goldlücke and Kranz (2012).
7The players can always ignore the bargaining phase, so V (SSPE) ⊇ V (SNB). Similarly, since
both games feature arbitrary public correlation devices and the bargaining phase is pure cheap
talk, V (SSPE)⊆ V (SNB).
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AXIOM IAC—Internal Agreement Consistency: For every history to the trans-
fer phase under agreement, if the agreement satisfies w ∈C(coV (s)), then contin-
uation play yields value w.8
Let SIAC be the subset of SSPE that satisfies IAC. Note that IAC does not
require the players to reach agreement. It merely defines the meaning of a
class of agreements, refining the equilibrium set due to the consequences in
off-equilibrium-path contingencies. Though IAC eliminates some equilibria, it
does not on its own refine the equilibrium value set.
THEOREM 1—IAC Has No Bite: It is the case that V (SIAC)= V (SSPE).
The proof, in Appendix A.1, actually strengthens the result by invoking a
stronger consistency axiom that also addresses agreements to switch to contin-
uations that are supported by other equilibria. Under IAC there may be de-
viant proposals that, if implemented, would make the proposer better off than
if he made his equilibrium proposal. However, it is always possible to deter a
deviant proposal by specifying that if the responder says “no,” then the players
should coordinate to punish the proposer and reward the responder. In this
way, the agreement consistency axiom is undermined by the fact that continu-
ation play can vary in arbitrary ways following a disagreement. To narrow the
set of equilibrium values, we need a theory of disagreement.
3.2. A No-Fault Theory of Disagreement
We next add a no-fault disagreement axiom that embodies a theory of how
players behave under disagreement. It requires that continuation play in the
absence of agreement—though it may vary with the history of actions, trans-
fers, and past agreements—should not vary with the manner in which bargain-
ing broke down.
Disagreement can arise in myriad ways. Bargaining may randomly break
down after a responder says “no,” following any sequence of equilibrium or
deviant offers. That disagreement play should not be sensitive to the manner
of breakdown represents the nostrum that “nothing is agreed until everything
is agreed.” That is, no player can be singled out for punishment for making an
innovative, deviant offer that is rejected or for rejecting an offer in hopes of
being able to make an innovative counteroffer. We also assume that play from
the action phase under disagreement is insensitive to the transfers just made so
8For simplicity, we state IAC in a somewhat stronger form than is necessary. The necessary part
is that the players should achieve the value of an agreement w if it is attainable with a transfer and
any continuation w′ ∈ D(coV (s)) that is actually attained by s after some history to the action
phase.
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as to capture the idea that a player can void an agreement by refusing to make
the required up-front payment.9
AXIOM NFD—No-Fault Disagreement: For every history to the action phase
under disagreement, continuation play is measurable with respect to the full-period
history at the end of the previous period and the current-period realization of the
public randomization device.10
Although NFD constrains the meaning of disagreements, by itself NFD does
little to constrain the set of attainable payoffs. In particular, in the realm of
pure-strategy equilibria, NFD does not alter the Pareto boundary of equilib-
rium continuation values; neither does it eliminate any payoffs attainable in a
subgame-perfect equilibrium without transfers.
To state this result, we need to introduce some extra notation; the proof
is given in Appendix A.1. Let SNFD be the subset of SSPE that satisfies NFD.
Let SpsSPE be the set of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria, let S
ps
NFD be the
subset of pure-strategy equilibria that satisfy NFD, and let SntSPE be the set of
subgame-perfect equilibria that specify zero transfers after all histories. For
any set of payoffs W ⊂R2, let P(W ) be the Pareto frontier of W .
THEOREM 2—NFD Has Little Bite: It is the case that P(V (SpsSPE)) =
P(V (S
ps
NFD)) and V (S
nt
SPE)⊆ V (SNFD).
In combination with IAC, however, NFD has strong effects. In particular, it
rules out the kinds of punishments used to discourage deviant proposals in the
proof of Theorem 1. Following any history, the bargaining phase (viewed in
isolation as a game in itself) has a unique disagreement outcome by NFD, and
a nondegenerate bargaining set by IAC. Therefore, it has unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium, as established by the literature on alternating-offer bar-
gaining (Binmore (1987), Rubinstein (1982), Shaked and Sutton (1984)). We
characterize the implications of NFD and IAC in Section 4.
Although the combination of NFD and IAC eliminates many equilibria, mul-
tiple Pareto-ranked equilibrium payoffs generally still survive. Our third axiom
allows the players to meaningfully discuss whether to switch to an equilibrium
that is “better” than the one they are currently playing. The following defini-
tion formalizes what makes one equilibrium better than another.
9In other words, transfers “seal the deal.” In the realm of relational contracts, where there is
always at least a rudimentary legal system in the background, this interpretation embodies the
fact that signing a contract can create a legal obligation to make an unconditioned payment, even
when no other contract clauses are legally enforceable. Adopting this interpretation formally
would require extra notation to keep track of the transfer required in agreement. Then, with a
slightly different version of IAC, we would obtain the same implications.
10Again, for simplicity, we state the axiom in a simpler, stronger form than needed. Section 8.1
discusses how NFD could be weakened without affecting the results.
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DEFINITION 1: A payoff set W ′ ⊂ R2 fully Pareto dominates another payoff
set W if (i) for every v′ ∈W ′, there is no v ∈W \W ′ that satisfies v ≥ v′ (com-
ponentwise), and (ii) for every v ∈ W , there exists v′ ∈ W ′ such that v′ ≥ v
(componentwise).
We say that a strategy profile s′ fully Pareto dominates another strategy profile
s if coV (s′) fully Pareto dominates coV (s). Because full Pareto dominance is
a demanding notion of dominance, the following axiom—that the players must
honor any agreement to deviate to an equilibrium that fully Pareto dominates
their current equilibrium—is relatively weak.
AXIOM PEAC—Pareto External Agreement Consistency: For every history
to the action phase under agreement in equilibrium s, if the agreement satisfiesw ∈
C(coV (s′)), where s′ ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD and coV (s′) fully Pareto dominates coV (s),
then continuation play yields value w.
As with IAC, Appendix A.1 shows that PEAC has no bite.
COROLLARY 1—PEAC Has No Bite: We have V (SPEAC)= V (SSPE).
But the three axioms together yield a sharp characterization. We define a
contractual equilibrium to be any subgame-perfect equilibrium that satisfies
IAC, NFD, and PEAC. Accordingly, let SPEAC be the set of equilibria that sat-
isfy PEAC and let SCE ≡ SIAC ∩ SNFD ∩ SPEAC. The next section shows that
V (SCE) is identical to a “dominant bargaining self-generated set” that we iden-
tify. The rest of this paper is devoted to characterizing this set.
4. REPRESENTATION
To characterize contractual equilibrium values, we compare the bargaining
phase in an individual period to a simple bargaining game in which (i) the play-
ers bargain directly over a fixed set of payoff vectors and (ii) the generalized
alternating-offer protocol is of the form described in Section 2.1. Analysis of
this simple bargaining game yields a “bargaining operator” that we embed in a
recursive construction of continuation values.
In the simple bargaining game, the players bargain over the selection of a
payoff vector from a set W ⊂ R2. If they fail to reach an agreement, then the
payoff vector is some value w ∈ W . Suppose that the sum of the players’ con-
tinuation payoffs—which we call the welfare level—is constant along the Pareto
boundary of W , and suppose this boundary includes all points above w with the
same welfare. Then the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium payoff vector w
satisfies





and w=w+π(w1 +w2 −w1 −w2)(4)
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where for each player i, πi = ∑∞=1(ρiβ∏−1k=1(1 − βk)). In other words, the
players maximize welfare, and they split the surplus in fractions π1 and π2. This
conclusion is stated in Lemma 6 in Appendix A.2. Let π = (π1π2) and note
that π1 +π2 = 1.
Next we construct a set of payoff vectors by calculating the equilibrium pay-
offs that can arise in the simple bargaining game when w can be any disagree-








) ∣∣∣w ∈W }
(5)
Returning to the repeated game, recall that operators D and C produce the
sets of continuation values from the action phase and transfer phase of a given
period, respectively, as a function of a set of continuation values W from the
start of the following period. We interpret C(W ) as the set of payoff-vector
alternatives for the players in the bargaining phase and interpret D(W ) as the
set of disagreement payoffs attainable from the transfer phase (with transfers
of zero). The bargaining operator, along with public randomization at the be-
ginning of the period, yields the compound operator coB(C(·)D(·)).11 We
examine fixed points of this compound operator.
DEFINITION 2: A nonempty set W ⊂ R2 is called a bargaining self-generated
(BSG) set if W = coB(C(W )D(W )).
Our next definition combines bargaining self-generation with full Pareto
dominance.
DEFINITION 3: A BSG set W ∗ ⊂ R2 is dominant if it fully Pareto dominates
every other BSG set.
By definition, there can be at most one dominant BSG set. Our represen-
tation theorem establishes a relation between sets of contractual equilibrium
values and bargaining self-generated sets. The theorem shows that the value
set of every contractual equilibrium is contained in the dominant BSG set, and
for each value in the dominant BSG set, there is a contractual equilibrium that
delivers it.
THEOREM 3—Representation: Given a game 〈Auδρβ〉, let πi =∑∞
=1(ρiβ
∏−1
k=1(1 −βk)) for each i. Then the following properties hold:
(i) If W is a BSG set, then W ⊆ V (SIAC ∩ SNFD); furthermore, if s ∈ SIAC ∩
SNFD, then coV (s) is a BSG set.
(ii) The set V (SCE) is the dominant BSG set.
11Recall that D(W ) ⊂ C(W ), welfare is constant along the Pareto boundary of C(W ), and
C(W ) extends to the edges of D(W ) along each player’s axis. This implies that B(C(·)D(·)) is
well-defined.
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The proof is given in Appendix A.2. In principle, every point in V (SCE) is an
equally good candidate to be selected as the equilibrium payoff in the first pe-
riod. By construction, the first period payoff must be v = B(C(V (SCE)) {w}),
where w ∈D(V (SCE)) is the payoff that arises if the players disagree in the first
period. But nothing pins down which point in D(V (SCE)) is selected to be the
disagreement point in the first period—neither the axioms nor any prior agree-
ment. The same is true of the disagreement payoff in any period following a
history in which the players have never agreed. So the problem of selecting
a particular equilibrium boils down to determining how the players will play if
they have never agreed. In applications, this behavior might arise from custom,
the status quo, or social institutions.
Note that the bargaining-protocol parameters ρ and β enter the definition
of the compound operator coB(C(·)D(·)) in ways summarized by π1 and π2.
Thus, the recursive construction of contractual equilibrium values can use a
simplified description of the game, given by 〈Auδπ〉. Also, the standard
connection between the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the noncooperative
bargaining game and a cooperative bargaining solution applies here. In partic-
ular, the equilibrium payoff w shown in Eq. (4) coincides with the generalized
Nash (1950) bargaining solution with weights π1 and π2. Thus, we call π a
vector of “bargaining weights,” understanding that these weights represent the
bargaining protocol.
5. CHARACTERIZATION
This section characterizes the set of contractual equilibrium values V (SCE)
and provides an algorithm for computing it. This section also provides results
on efficiency and how bargaining power affects what values are attainable. The
characterization shows that every BSG set (and hence V (SCE)) is a line seg-
ment with slope −1. Equivalently, every BSG set has two endpoints z1 z2 ∈R,
satisfying z11 + z12 = z21 + z22 . Let z1 be the endpoint that favors player 2 (“pun-
ishing” player 1) and let z2 be the endpoint that favors player 1. For any such
set W , we define span(W )≡ z21 −z11 = z12 −z22 and level(W )≡ z11 +z12 = z21 +z22 ,
which are the vertical distance, or payoff span, across W and the joint value, or
welfare level, respectively, of each point in W .
5.1. Existence and Construction
We begin by showing that V (SCE) exists for any discount factor.
THEOREM 4—Existence: For a game 〈Auδπ〉, if A is finite, then V (SCE)
is a nonempty, compact line segment of slope −1.
The next result provides a complete, constructive characterization of V (SCE).
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THEOREM 5—Construction: For a game 〈Auδπ〉, if A is finite and W ∗ =
V (SCE), then the following properties hold:
(i) The span(W ∗) is equal to the maximal fixed point of Γ ≡ γ2 + γ1, where










η :A→ [−d0] extended to ˆA
α ∈ ˆA is a Nash equilibrium
of
〈Ai ×Aj (1 − δ)(uiuj)+ δ(η−η)〉

(ii) level(W ∗) is equal to maxηα(u1(α)+ u2(α))
s.t.
{
η :A→ [0 span(W ∗)] extended to ˆA
α ∈ ˆA is a Nash equilibrium of 〈A (1 − δ)u+ δ(η−η)〉
(7)
(iii) The endpoints of W ∗ are
z1 = (−11)γ1(span(W ∗))+π level(W ∗)(8)
z2 = (1−1)γ2(span(W ∗))+π level(W ∗)
(9)
The rest of this subsection contains the proof of Theorems 4 and 5. We pro-
ceed with a series of lemmas that characterize the geometry of BSG sets and
the relation between them; we then identify a dominant BSG set. Proofs of the
first three lemmas are presented in Appendix A.3.
LEMMA 1: IfW ⊂R2 is a BSG set, then it is a bounded, convex subset of a line
with slope −1.
Thus all points in W have the same welfare level. Observe that it is possible
for a BSG set to not contain one or both of its endpoints. We first focus atten-
tion on BSG sets that are closed; later we argue that any open BSG set is fully
Pareto dominated by V (SCE), which is closed. So consider the endpoints z1 and
z2 of an arbitrary closed BSG set. As z1 and z2 are extreme points of B(W W ),
there exist disagreement points w1w2 ∈W relative to which z1 and z2 are the
bargaining outcomes that satisfy Eq. (4). We will express z1 and z2 in relation
to optimization problems parameterized by the welfare level and payoff span
of W .
LEMMA 2: For a given closed BSG set W , z21 = π1 level(W ) + γ2(span(W ))
and z12 = π2 level(W ) + γ1(span(W )). Furthermore, γ1(d) and γ2(d) exist and
satisfy γ2(d)+ γ1(d)≥ 0 for all d ≥ 0.
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The proof operates by solving the problem of maximizing a player’s payoff
that can be supported by continuation values in W as a function of the wel-
fare level and payoff span of W . Now we can compare BSG sets by using the
functions γ1 and γ2. We find that BSG sets are ranked by full Pareto domi-
nance, since a larger set of continuation values—regardless of its position in
R
2—supports a larger range of stage-game action profiles.
LEMMA 3: Suppose that W is a closed BSG set and W ′ is any BSG set. If
span(W )≥ span(W ′), then W fully Pareto dominates W ′.
We next use the functions γ1 and γ2 to prove the existence of a fully Pareto-
dominant BSG set. First, for any BSG set W with endpoints z1 and z2,
span(W )= z21 − z11 = z21 −
(
level(W )− z12
)= z21 + z12 − level(W )
(10)
Substituting for z21 and z
1
2 using Lemma 2 yields span(W ) = γ2(span(W )) +
γ1(span(W )). Thus, the payoff span of a BSG set must be a fixed point of Γ .
Further, as the analysis underlying Lemma 2 makes clear, every fixed point of
Γ is the payoff span of a BSG set.
LEMMA 4: The function Γ has a maximal fixed point d∗ ≥ 0.
PROOF: Observe that Γ is nondecreasing because an increase in payoff span
relaxes the constraints in the problems that define γ1 and γ2. The function Γ is
bounded because u is bounded and δ is fixed. By Tarski’s fixed-point theorem,
Γ has a maximal fixed point, which is nonnegative because Γ (0)≥ 0. Q.E.D.
To construct W ∗ from d∗, let λ∗ be the value of maxηα(u1(α)+u2(α)) subject
to the constraints in Eq. (7), using d∗ in place of span(W ). Then construct the
endpoints z1 and z2 by Eq. (8), using d∗ in place of span(W ) and λ∗ in place of
level(W ). By construction, W ∗ ≡ co{z1 z2} is a BSG set and its span is maximal
over all BSG sets. By Lemma 3, W ∗ fully Pareto dominates all other closed
BSG sets.
To complete the proof, we return to the case of BSG sets that may not be
closed. Taking the closure of a BSG set does not necessarily form a BSG set,
because new Nash equilibria could emerge in the dynamic program. But for
any open BSG set, the following lemma shows that there exists a larger, closed
BSG set.
LEMMA 5: If W is a BSG set that is not closed, then there exists a closed BSG
set that fully Pareto dominates W .
PROOF: Let W be an open BSG set. Define γˆj(d) to be the same as
γj(d) except that (i) its objective is a supremum rather than a maximum
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and (ii) the range of η is defined as the open interval (−d0) rather than
[−d0]. Then span(W ) is a fixed point of γˆ2 + γˆ1. By construction, γˆ2 + γˆ1 ≤
γ2 + γ1, so Γ (span(W )) ≥ span(W ). Because Γ is increasing and bounded,
d∗ ≥ span(W ). One can easily confirm that Lemma 2 extends to nonclosed
BSG sets, implying that W ∗ fully Pareto dominates W . Therefore, W ∗ is not
open. A parallel argument implies that W ∗ cannot contain just one of its end-
points. Q.E.D.
Thus W ∗ = V (SCE), proving Theorems 4 and 5.
5.2. Efficiency
To indicate the dependence of γi and Γ on δ, we write γiδ and Γδ. Observe
that Γδ is bounded and increasing in δ. In fact, if Γδ(d) > 0 for some d and some
δ, then Γδ′(d) ≥ d for δ′ sufficiently large, implying that d∗ is bounded away
from zero for discount factors close enough to 1. If this is the case, then any
action profile can be supported in a single period if the players are sufficiently
patient. Moreover, Γδ(∞) does not depend on δ. These observations lead to a
necessary and sufficient condition for patient players to attain payoffs on the
efficient frontier of the payoff set.
THEOREM 6: If Γ (∞) > 0, then d∗ > 0, and V (SCE) is a subset of the efficient
frontier for δ sufficiently close to 1. If Γ (∞) = 0, then V (SCE) attains the same
welfare level as the welfare-maximizing Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Proofs for the remainder of this section are provided in Appendix B.1 of the
Supplemental Material (Miller and Watson (2013)), along with methods for
constructing efficient contractual equilibria when the best response correspon-
dences satisfy certain properties.
5.3. The Role of Relative Bargaining Power
In static bargaining games with transferable utility, the allocation of bargain-
ing power typically has no effect on the level of welfare. In contractual equi-
librium, however, the bargaining weights play a critical role in determining the
span of V (SCE) and, hence, the welfare level attainable in contractual equilib-
rium. In fact, in general, the highest welfare level is attained when bargaining
power is extremely unequal, that is, when one player has a monopoly over the
right to propose.
THEOREM 7: Given A, δ, and u, level(V (SCE)) is maximized at either π =
(01) or π = (10).
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For intuition, consider a BSG set associated with two disagreement points,
one of which is closer to the Pareto frontier than the other. The BSG set is the
projection of the two disagreement points onto the frontier in the direction of
the bargaining shares. Since equal bargaining shares form a vector perpendic-
ular to the frontier, they do not maximize the projected distance between the
disagreement points. Even when the stage game is symmetric, extreme bargain-
ing power (in either direction) can yield strictly higher welfare than interior
bargaining power. This feature is illustrated by the prisoners’ dilemmas in the
following subsection. In an asymmetric game, typically one extreme will yield
the highest welfare, as displayed in the applications described in Section 7.
5.4. Application to the Prisoners’ Dilemma
To illustrate contractual equilibrium and compare it with other concepts,




where r > 0, x > 1, and x− r < 2. Cooperation can be sustained in a subgame-
perfect equilibrium if δ ≥ x−1
x
. In this case, the Pareto frontier of SPE payoff
vectors is the entire line segment from (02) to (20).
We calculate the contractual equilibrium value set V (SCE) by applying The-
orems 5 and 6. Observe that if δ1−δd ≥ max{r2(x− 1)}, then
γ2(d)= max{π2 −π1 − (x− 1) π2x−π2r −π1x−π2r 0}(11)
γ1(d)= max{π1 −π2 − (x− 1) −π2x−π1r π1x−π1r 0}(12)
where the elements in each maximand are the values at CC, DC, CD, and DD,
in this order. Because D is a dominant strategy in the stage game, the values at
mixed strategies are convex combinations of these.
Theorem 6 tells us to plug in d = ∞ to see whether sufficiently patient
players can support CC along the equilibrium path. It is clear that γ2(∞) +
γ1(∞) > 0 if and only if either x > r or |π2 −π1|> x− 1, which by Theorem 6
is necessary and sufficient for CC to be supported in contractual equilibrium
for sufficiently high δ < 1. If, on the other hand, x < r and |π2 − π1| < x− 1,
then W ∗ = {(00)} regardless of δ. These results also illustrate Theorem 7:
for any given prisoners’ dilemma, the condition for obtaining efficiency at high
discount factors is most relaxed when π1 = 1 or π2 = 1.
To get a feel for the construction of the set W ∗, consider Figure 1. Sup-
pose that π1 = π2, x > r, and δ1−δ(x − r) ≥ r, so the players attain efficiency.
Consider player 1’s favorite point z2, which is achieved with reference to the
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FIGURE 1.—The prisoners’ dilemma with equal bargaining power. The parameters satisfy
x > r and (π1π2) = ( 12  12 ). The endpoint z2 is attained by playing CC in the stage game and
using a transfer to split the surplus relative to the disagreement point w2. The disagreement
point w2, in turn, is attained by playing DC in the stage game and continuing with promised util-
ity v2 if no deviation occurs, but promised utility z2 if player 2 deviates. Minimizing z22 subject
to enforcing DC under disagreement and CC under agreement requires both v22 − z22 ≥ 1−δδ r and
1 − z22 ≥ 1−δδ (x− 1).
disagreement point w2 that is furthest in the direction (π2−π1) = ( 12 − 12).
In turn, w2 is the weighted average of u(DC) = (x−r) and a point v2 ∈ W ∗.
The former gets weight (1 − δ) and represents the payoff in the current pe-
riod, whereas the latter has weight δ and gives the continuation payoff from
the next period. Player 1 prefers that v2 be “pushed” down and to the right.
However, v2 cannot equal z2 because there must be room to punish player 2 if
he were to deviate from DC. If player 2 deviates, the continuation value z2 is
selected; otherwise, the continuation value is v2. To discourage player 2’s devi-
ation from DC, it must be that v22 −z22 ≥ 1−δδ r. To support efficiency, it must also
be that 1−z22 ≥ 1−δδ (x−1) to discourage deviations from CC. The construction
is pictured in Figure 1.
The contractual equilibrium set is intuitively satisfying in two key ways. First,
as Figure 1 demonstrates, contractual equilibrium yields a strict subset of the
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Pareto frontier when CC is sustained along the equilibrium path.12 It can be
shown that both endpoints of this subset shift toward higher payoffs for player
i when πi increases, so (conditional on sustaining CC on the equilibrium path)
each player’s share of the available welfare is increasing (in a set-ordered
sense) in his bargaining power. Second, contractual equilibrium has the ap-
pealing property that equilibrium welfare decreases (weakly) as r increases,
because higher r makes it more difficult to support play of DC or CD under
disagreement.
These properties contrast with the equilibria selected by renegotiation-
proofness theories. Goldlücke and Kranz (2013; henceforth GK) showed that
if renegotiation is applied only before the transfer phase, then “strong optimal-
ity” (Levin (2003)), “strong perfection” (Rubinstein (1980)), and “strong rene-
gotiation proofness” (Farrell and Maskin (1989)) all select the entire Pareto
frontier of SPE payoffs. For a discount factor of at least x−1
x
, this is the line
segment between (02) and (20). Contractual equilibrium is more restrictive.
For instance, in the case of π1 = π2 = 1/2, if x < r, then contractual equilib-
rium selects only the value (00), regardless of the discount factor. If x ≥ r,
then the lowest discount factor that supports CC in a contractual equilibrium
is max{ r
x
 2x−23x−r−2 }, which strictly exceeds x−1x , and in this case, contractual equi-
librium selects a strict subset of the SPE Pareto frontier.13
Although none of the renegotiation refinements that GK studied allows for
disagreement, in terms of their equilibrium construction, one can construe a
refusal to make a specified transfer as a disagreement. To illustrate, consider a
GK equilibrium that sustains CC along the equilibrium path. If player 1 refuses
to make a transfer, he is first punished with DD in the subsequent action phase
and then is required to make a transfer that yields him a zero payoff in the
continuation. Since CC is still played in all future periods, the continuation
payoff vector under disagreement is (1 − δ)(02). If the players were able to
bargain, their surplus in average terms would be δ2 > 0, and yet player 1 would
capture none of it—as if he had no bargaining power. That is, reconciling this
equilibrium with any notion of bargaining would require that all the bargaining
power be endogenously reallocated to whichever player is not being punished.
Section 8.1 further discusses history-dependent bargaining power.
To illustrate how bargaining power influences the contractual equilibrium
set, consider the prisoners’ dilemma when one player has all the bargaining
12Since w−ii ≥ 0 is required by individual rationality, πi > 0 implies z−ii > 0.
13Another approach in the renegotiation-proofness literature allows Pareto-dominated pun-
ishments as long as the players recognize that such punishments are needed to support high pay-
offs at subsequent histories. For instance, the “consistent bargaining” theory of Abreu, Pearce,
and Stacchetti (1993), which applies only to symmetric games, selects the best symmetric equi-
librium from among those that maximize the minimum payoff any player earns at any history.
Applying this notion prior to the transfer phase and, without loss of generality, employing sta-
tionary “simple strategies” as defined by GK, yields a straightforward conclusion: the value set of
the optimal consistent bargaining equilibrium converges to {(11)} as δ→ 1.
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FIGURE 2.—The prisoners’ dilemma with unequal bargaining power. The parameters satisfy
x < r, x < 2, and (π1π2)= (10). Each endpoint zi is attained by playing CC in the stage game
and using a transfer to give player 1 all the surplus relative to the disagreement point wi . The
disagreement point w2 is attained by playing DD in the stage game and continuing with promised
utility z2 regardless of whether a deviation occurs. The disagreement point w1 is attained by
playing CC in the stage game and continuing with promised utility v1 if no deviation occurs, but
promised utility zi if player i deviates unilaterally.
power, as illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose that x − r < 0 and x < 2; under
these conditions, if both players had equal bargaining power, then in con-
tractual equilibrium they could attain only (00). But suppose instead that
π1 = 1 = 1−π2. Then Γ (d)= γ1(d)= 2−x whenever δ1−δd ≥ 2(x−1), because
γ2(d)= 0 for all d ≥ 0. State 2—which punishes player 2—uses DD under dis-
agreement.14 Since player 2 has no bargaining power, she receives a payoff
of zero under both agreement and disagreement. State 1 uses CC under both
disagreement and agreement. This dramatically different construction arises
because CC and DD are relatively cheap in terms of incentives (because x < r,
14Strictly speaking, there is an indeterminacy in state 2 behavior under disagreement—the
arg max of γ2 includes both DC and DD when π2 = 0. However, only DD arises along any se-
quence with π2 > 0 and π2 → 0.
DISAGREEMENT IN REPEATED GAMES 2323
CD and DC are very expensive), and their projections onto the Pareto frontier
in the direction of the bargaining power are widely separated.
These results show that contractual equilibrium generates specific predic-
tions for the prisoners’ dilemma, including predictions that distinguish it from
renegotiation proofness.
6. GENERALIZATION
This section extends our analysis to a general model with more than two
players, imperfect public monitoring, and heterogeneous discount factors. For
simplicity, we do not specify the bargaining process, but instead assume that
there exist bargaining weights that summarize the relevant backward induction
solution of the bargaining phase under the axioms. (It would be cumbersome,
but straightforward, to construct such a bargaining process using a generalized
alternating-offer protocol.15) A simplified description of a game in this class is
a tuple 〈nAΘ fuδπ〉, with the following components:
• A finite number of players n.
• A stage game, featuring a set of action profiles A =A1 × · · · ×An, a set
of public signals Θ, a signal distribution function f :A→ Θ, and payoff func-
tions (ui :Ai ×Θ→R)ni=1.• A vector of discount factors δ ∈ [01)n, where δi denotes player i’s dis-
count factor.
• Bargaining weights π = (π1π2 
 
 
 πn), with π ≥ 0 and ∑ni=1 πi = 1.
In the stage game, the players simultaneously select their actions, yielding ac-
tion profile a ∈A. Public signal θ ∈Θ is then realized according to the proba-
bility measure f (·|a). The players publicly observe θ, but they do not observe
each other’s actions. We write u(aθ) ≡ (ui(ai θ))ni=1, and extend f and u to
the space of mixed actions. We examine a “perfect public” notion of contrac-
tual equilibrium in which the disagreement point and all individual actions are
conditioned on only the public history.
Since utility in average terms is no longer necessarily transferable, we ex-
press continuation payoffs in total terms rather than average terms. To make
the difference clear in notation, values that were in average terms in previous
sections but are now in total terms are shown with a tilde. The construction of a
continuation value w˜ from the negotiation phase must now incorporate (i) con-
tinuation values as a function of the public signal and (ii) the players’ possibly
different discount factors. For any two vectors xx′ ∈ Rn, define the compo-
nentwise multiplication operator ∗ as x ∗ x′ ≡ (x1x′1x2x′2 
 
 
  xnx′n). We use
the standard notation x · x′ for the dot product of x and x′, and define 1 as
15Alternating-offer bargaining games with three or more players can have many equilibria. The
multiplicity can be resolved by selecting the unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in the isolated
bargaining game, which can be viewed as imposing NFD on each round of bargaining rather than
merely after bargaining breaks down.
2324 D. A. MILLER AND J. WATSON






u(αθ)+ δ ∗ g˜(θ))df(θ|α)(13)




i = 0} is the transfer, α ∈ ˆA is the mixed
action profile, g˜(θ) is the continuation value from the start of the next period
following public signal θ, and f (θ|α) is the probability measure on Θ that arises





u(αθ)+ δ ∗ g˜(θ))df(θ|α)
(14)
We say that g˜ :Θ→ W˜ enforces α if α is a Nash equilibrium of the game with
action-profile space A and payoffs given by ∫
θ∈Θ(u(aθ) + δ ∗ g˜(θ))df (θ|a).
Operators D, C, and B are revised as
D(W˜ )≡ {w˜ ∈Rn ∣∣(15)
∃ g˜ :Θ→ W˜ and α ∈ ˆA
s.t. g˜ enforces α and Eq. (14) holds
}

C(W˜ )≡ {w˜ ∈Rn ∣∣(16)
∃m ∈R20 and w˜′ ∈D(W )
s.t. w˜=m+ w˜′ and w˜ ∈D(W˜ )}
where D is defined as before, and






1 · w˜′ − 1 · w˜
) ∣∣∣ w˜ ∈ W˜ }
(17)
As before, W˜ is a BSG set if W˜ = coB(C(W˜ )D(W˜ )); the definition of full
Pareto dominance carries over unchanged as well.
With A and Θ finite, we can guarantee existence.
THEOREM 8: Consider any n-player game in the simplified form 〈nAΘ fu
δπ〉. If A and Θ are finite and δi ∈ [01) for all i, then the game has a unique
dominant BSG set W˜ ∗. Moreover, W˜ ∗ is a compact hyperpolygon contained in a
hyperplane normal to the vector 1.
The proof, given in Appendix B.2 in the Supplemental Material, examines
a fixed-point problem for a transformation of the self-generation operator
coB(C(·)D(·)). The transformation normalizes the set of continuation values
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by subtracting the welfare level in a direction that accounts for the heteroge-
neous discount factors and bargaining shares. Since the normalized bargain-
ing operator preserves compactness, and is bounded, monotone, and continu-
ous on decreasing sets, Tarski’s fixed-point theorem guarantees a largest fixed
point—which is a hyperpolygon in Rn.
For the special case of two players, V˜ (SCE) can be explicitly characterized
even allowing for imperfect public monitoring and asymmetric discount factors
δ= (δ1 δ2). As in Section 5.1, the contractual equilibrium set is a compact line
segment of slope −1, where each endpoint is an agreement value formed with
reference to an appropriately chosen disagreement point. Since the heteroge-
neous discount factors impose significant extra notation, we reserve the gory
details for Appendix B.2.
For symmetric games, a small disparity in discount factors has a similar ef-
fect to a small disparity in bargaining power: as the following corollary shows,
the more patient player gains and the less patient player loses, but in average
terms, the gains outweigh the losses. Let z¯i ≡ 12(1−δi) (z1i + z2i ), that is, player i’s
average payoff across the two states, in average terms. Let z¯ = 12(z¯1 + z¯2), that
is, the average welfare across the two states, in average terms.
COROLLARY 2: If the stage game is symmetric and π = ( 12  12), then, fixing the
average discount factor, z¯ strictly increases in any sufficiently small disparity be-
tween the discount factors, while the less patient player’s average payoff across the
two states strictly decreases.
7. APPLICATION TO RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
In this section, we use contractual equilibrium to examine the role of bar-
gaining power in a principal-agent relationship and to explore the impact of ex-
ternal enforcement. We then comment on possible connections with the macro
labor literature.
7.1. A Principal-Agent Problem
We first investigate the role of bargaining power in the context of a principal-
agent model with moral hazard, based on Levin (2003). We find that the agent’s
effort is increasing in his bargaining power and that the principal prefers an
intermediate level of bargaining power.
In each stage game, the agent chooses effort e ∈ [0 e], incurring a cost c(e),
and then the principal makes a voluntary payment to the agent. The principal’s
revenue is a random variable θ, with probability density f (·|e) and full sup-
port on a compact interval. The expected payoff vector in the stage game (i.e.,
excluding transfers) is u(e)= (−c(e) ∫ θdf (θ|e)). The principal does not ob-
serve e, but θ is public, so the principal’s voluntary payment can be conditioned
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on θ. We assume that c is strictly increasing and strictly convex, c(0)= 0, f has
the monotone likelihood property,
∫
θdf (θ|0)= 0, and f (θ|e= c−1(·)) is con-
vex. The players engage in bargaining and can make voluntary transfers before
the stage game in each period, and they share a common discount factor δ < 1.
We normalize payoffs by (1 − δ) to put them in average terms.
Suppose there is no external enforcement. What is the maximum effort that
can be sustained in equilibrium? The answer depends on the allocation of bar-
gaining power, where πA ≥ 0 is the agent’s bargaining share and 1 − πA is the
principal’s. Appendix B.2 shows that in a two-player game such as this, it suf-
fices to construct an equilibrium using a two-state machine, where state P re-
wards the agent and state A punishes the agent. The construction is illustrated
in Figure 3.
In state P, for disagreement play, we seek an effort level that rewards the
agent—for example, zero effort. Since it is the agent’s optimum in the stage
game, there is no need for continuation utilities to vary so as to provide
him incentives. So after a disagreement in state P, the players stay in state P
FIGURE 3.—The principal-agent game. The disagreement point wP is attained by playing
stage-game Nash equilibrium e= 0 and continuing with promised utility zP regardless of θ. The
disagreement point wA is attained by playing e= e∗ in the stage game, continuing with promised
utility zP if θ ≥ θˆ(e∗), where e∗ is the maximum effort supported by the difference between zPA
and zAA, and continuing with promised utility z
A otherwise.
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the following period regardless of the realized output. Under agreement in
state P, the players recognize that their “outside option” is to disagree, im-
plement zero effort, and then return to state P next period. Therefore, their
utility (specifically, their vector of average discounted utilities) under disagree-
ment is a convex combination of (00) and their agreement utility in state P.
Since the agent obtains a πA fraction of the surplus, their agreement utility
is (πA1 − πA) · (E(θ|e∗)− c(e∗)), where e∗ is the equilibrium path effort. To
attain this utility, the principal makes a payment to the agent as part of their
agreement. The principal is willing to pay because doing so gives her strictly
higher utility than does the disagreement that would arise should she fail to
pay.
In state A, we seek an effort level under disagreement that punishes the
agent. The best candidate is the equilibrium path effort e∗, which is the highest
effort that can be enforced using equilibrium continuation utilities. This effort
level is enforced by staying in state A for low realizations of θ and transiting
to state P for high realizations of θ.16 As Levin showed, the optimal cutoff
for enforcing effort level e∗ is the output level θˆ(e∗) at which ∂
∂e
f (θ|e)|e=e∗ ,
as a function of θ, switches from negative to positive (by the monotone likeli-
hood property, this identifies a unique output level). In fact, this same incentive
scheme must be used whenever the agent is to exert effort e∗, that is, in state P
under agreement as well as in state A under both agreement and disagreement.
Since optimal effort is played under disagreement in state A, disagreement is
already on the Pareto frontier of what is attainable in equilibrium. Hence there
is no surplus to share, so play is the same under agreement and disagreement.
Because the agent can always deviate to zero effort in every period, his utility
in state A must be at least zero. To provide the maximal incentives, in fact his
utility in state A should be exactly zero.
Equilibrium path effort e∗ is thus a fixed point of the agent’s optimization
problem:17
e∗ ∈ arg max
e∈[0e]
(−(1 − δ)c(e)(18)
+ δPr(θ≥ θˆ(e∗)∣∣e)πA(E(θ|e∗)− c(e∗)))

Because the principal and the agent negotiate over how to play, they will jointly
select the highest fixed point. Since incentives are stronger the more weight
the agent places on the second term in his objective function, we see that e∗
increases in δ and πA, and converges to efficient effort as δ→ 1 and πA → 1.
16If the principal could promise a voluntary payment for high realizations of θ in the action
phase, it would have the same effect as transitioning to state P.
17We assume for convenience that e ∈ arg maxe∈[0e][E(θ|e)− c(e)], so inefficiently high effort
is infeasible.
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Observe that only zero effort is supported if the principal has all the bar-
gaining power (πA = 0). Suppose that the agent exerts zero effort if the players
have never agreed; then their agreement in the first period selects zP as their
initial payoffs. In that case, the principal also receives zero utility if she has
no bargaining power (πA = 1), so her utility is nonmonotone in πA. An insti-
tution that selects a Pareto-optimal bargaining protocol will always endow the
agent with some bargaining power, leading the agent to earn payoffs strictly
higher than zero, that is, an internal efficiency wage. In particular, the princi-
pal will prefer to have more bargaining power for herself when it is easier to
motivate the agent—such as when the discount factor is higher, when output
is less noisy (holding the expected returns to effort fixed), or when there is an
additional signal that is informative about the agent’s effort.
Levin’s “strongly optimal” equilibrium relies on continuation play that, fol-
lowing an out-of-equilibrium offer by the principal, punishes the principal if
the agent rejected but punishes the agent if the agent accepted. Since the dis-
agreement outcome is sensitive to the manner of disagreement, there is little
role for the exercise of bargaining power. In contractual equilibrium, in con-
trast, NFD ensures a well-defined default point for bargaining each period,
while internal and Pareto external agreement consistency allow the agents to
endogenously select a division of the surplus that accords with their bargaining
power.
7.2. External Enforcement and Self-Enforcement
To further illustrate the usefulness of contractual equilibrium, this section
considers the question posed by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994; hence-
forth BGM): Does external enforcement help or harm self-enforcement?
BGM focused on “trigger punishments” in which the agent punishes the prin-
cipal for reneging on a voluntary payment by refusing to accept “implicit”
(self-enforced) contracts offered in the future. When “explicit” (externally
enforced) contracts are available, BGM assumed that even in a trigger pun-
ishment, the agent would accept an externally enforced contract and, there-
fore, the principal offers the externally enforced contract that maximizes her
profit.18 BGM’s key insight is that the threat of terminating the relationship
is a more severe punishment than reverting to profit-maximizing externally
enforced contracts and can, therefore, support higher payoffs in equilibrium.
Thus, BGM found that externally enforced and self-enforced contracts can be
substitutes.
18BGM adopted this assumption “because the purely game-theoretic analyses of renegotiation
abstract from institutions that would influence renegotiation in the labor market we consider.”
By explicitly modeling the bargaining process, our framework provides tools that answer this
challenge.
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In contrast, recent empirical studies find complementarity between exter-
nally enforced and self-enforced contracts: better external enforcement im-
proves the ability of partners to self-enforce their agreements (Beuve and
Saussier (2012), Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger (2004), Ryall and Sampson
(2009)). We show here that complementarity follows generally from the analy-
sis of contractual equilibrium.
A trigger punishment (either termination or reversion to only explicit con-
tracts) is generally not viable under agreement in contractual equilibrium, be-
cause the principal and the agent can bargain their way out of it. Likewise, an
explicit “spot market” contract of the sort considered by BGM would not arise
under disagreement in contractual equilibrium, because it requires the agree-
ment of both parties. That is, an externally enforced contract cannot serve as
the players’ “fallback position” unless it is already in place prior to bargaining.
Thus, the fallback position is continued interaction under the parties’ initial
long-term contract (the employment contract).
To broaden our results, we generalize the model from Section 7.1 to allow
for external enforcement of some less productive form of effort. At first, we
take the externally enforced contract to be given exogenously; we discuss later
how it might be chosen endogenously. We find that when the agent has some
bargaining power, the availability of external enforcement always improves the
prospects for self-enforcement. In particular, an optimal long-term externally
enforced contract induces the agent to exert counterproductive effort by com-
pensating him for his verifiable effort costs. This externally enforced contract is
always undone by self-enforced incentives under agreement; it directly drives
only behavior under disagreement. A surplus-destroying externally enforced
contract raises the stakes of bargaining when the agent is rewarded, enabling
the agent to capture more of the surplus. When the agent is being punished, the
same behavior is implemented under disagreement and agreement, so there is
no surplus to bargain over. Compared to the case without external enforce-
ment, the difference in the agent’s payoff under agreement in the two states is
greater, supporting higher effort on the equilibrium path.19
The contractual equilibrium we describe is similar to that outlined in Sec-
tion 7.1 and is illustrated in Figure 4. In state P under disagreement, the prin-
cipal pays only to the letter of the externally enforced contract and the agent
plays his stage-game best response. In state A under disagreement and in both
states under agreement, the agent plays his equilibrium-path effort, and is op-
timally rewarded by transiting to state P for good outcomes and is punished by
transiting to state A for bad outcomes.
Suppose that the agent chooses both the kind and the level of his effort. As
before, his effort level is e ∈ [0 e] and his effort cost is c(e). However, there
19Kvaløy and Olsen (2009) found that relational contracting is strengthened when parties agree
on a breach remedy that minimizes surplus. In their model, breach is triggered by a deviation in
the action phase and leads to a trigger punishment in which bargaining is disallowed.
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FIGURE 4.—The explicit contract game. Disagreement point wP is attained by playing the
stage-game Nash equilibrium (III eˆ) under the externally enforced contract, then continuing
with promised utility zP regardless of θ. Disagreement point wA is attained by playing (I e∗),
continuing with promised utility zP if θ ≥ θˆ(I e∗) (where e∗ is the maximum type I effort sup-
ported by the payoff span of W ∗) and continuing with promised utility zA otherwise. Compared
to the principal-agent game (see Figure 3), the payoff span of W ∗ is larger, so higher effort is
attained in equilibrium.
are now three kinds of effort. Type I effort is the same as in the previous section
and is not externally enforceable. Type II effort is externally enforceable, but
less productive: it generates distribution over output fˆ (·|e), satisfying the same
conditions as f , but is first-order stochastically dominated by f (·|e) for every
e > 0. Type III effort is also externally enforceable, but is counterproductive:
for concreteness and simplicity, assume that it generates a distribution f˜ (·|e)
such that f˜ (θ|e)= fˆ (−θ|e) for all e. Given the externally enforced contract, let
(Eˆ eˆ) be the agent’s stage-game best response, where Eˆ ∈ {I II III}, and let
uˆ be the expected stage-game payoff vector, including the externally enforced
contractual payments, that results when the agent plays (Eˆ eˆ). Because the
agent can always deviate to obtain uˆA, his utility in each state must be at least
uˆA. To provide maximal incentives, of course, his utility in state A, zAA, should
be exactly uˆ under both agreement and disagreement.
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In state P under agreement, the principal and the agent share the surplus
according to their bargaining shares, so the agent’s utility is















The strength of the agent’s incentives is measured by the difference be-
tween his payoffs under agreement in state P and state A; that is, zPA − zAA =
πA(E(θ|e∗)− c(e∗)− (uˆA + uˆP)). Therefore, if πA > 0, then his incentives are
strictly decreasing in uˆA + uˆP. Intuitively, when joint payoffs are lower under
disagreement in state P, there is more to be gained from agreeing, and the
agent gets a πA share of the gains.
So far we have assumed that the externally enforced contract is exogenous.
But suppose the externally enforced contract is jointly chosen by the principal
and the agent in their first-period bargaining phase. Since their joint payoff
in equilibrium is strictly decreasing in their joint payoff under disagreement
in state P, they want their externally enforced contract to destroy enough sur-
plus to support unconstrained efficient effort on the equilibrium path. In a
broader environment, surplus destruction could be constrained by the ability
of the principal to fire the agent at some cost and the agent to quit at some
cost. If there are tight constraints on surplus destruction, then a straight salary
without externally enforced incentives can be optimal.
7.3. Connections With the Macro Labor Literature
Bargaining power and moral hazard play important roles in the macro la-
bor literature, but there is room to better integrate them and also allow for
continued interaction under disagreement. On the role of bargaining power,
the macro labor search literature (following Diamond and Maskin (1979)) ex-
amines long-term relationships in which trading partners meet in a frictional
matching market and negotiate whether to initiate an employment relation-
ship. Terms of trade are set according to the Nash bargaining solution, with
the disagreement point being the parties’ expected values of separating and
returning to the unmatched pools.20 However, Hall and Milgrom (2008) have
20Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), and others ex-
tended this approach by applying the Nash bargaining solution at each instant to represent re-
current bargaining. den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) and Genicot and Ray (2006) applied a
similar approach to credit markets.
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criticized this assumption as unrealistic. Their point is that if separation is vol-
untary, then the disagreement point should be defined not as the parties’ sep-
aration values, but as their continuation values in their current relationship—
including the possibility, but not the requirement, of separation.
On moral hazard, workers can be motivated by “efficiency wages” that they
would lose if fired from their jobs. Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), tra-
ditional efficiency wage models assume that firms commit to a constant wage,
so there is no ongoing bargaining between firms and workers. More recently,
the relational contracts literature has started to address the question of how
firms can commit endogenously to wage schedules that may vary with output
or other monitoring signals. However, in these models, bargaining power ei-
ther does not play a role (e.g., MacLeod and Malcomson (1989, 1998), Levin
(2003)) or is applied only at the beginning of the relationship (e.g., Ramey and
Watson (1997, 2001), Moen and Rosén (2011)).
Our analysis indicates that the institutional setting that underlies bargaining
power may influence the returns to the employment relationship, because the
worker’s payoffs both on the equilibrium path and after a deviation (the differ-
ence between which constitutes the effective efficiency wage) are endogenously
selected through the bargaining process. This is important not only when the
moral hazard problem concerns the worker’s efforts, but also where it concerns
his investments, such as in human capital.21 It may be useful to empirically
evaluate aspects of productive relationships that are influenced by bargaining
power, and also find ways to measure bargaining power directly. Regarding the
latter, at the industry or firm level, one might associate bargaining power with
the level of unionization. For instance, Dobbelaere (2004) found that the to-
tal surplus divided between the firm and workers is positively correlated with
unionization, which is consistent with our principal-agent example. In a related
case study, Guy (2003) suggested that initiation of a customer service program
increased the workers’ bargaining power, resulting in better effort incentives,
but also greater rents for the workers. Though these results may be suggestive,
further research is needed to help understand the relationship between collec-
tive bargaining power at the union level and the moral hazard problems that
play out primarily at the level of an individual worker.
8. CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION
This section discusses links between our approach and the prior literatures
on preplay communication and renegotiation proofness. We comment on the
implications of varying the axioms and the structure of the model, and discuss
connections with experimental work.
21In principle, these interrelationships could affect the propagation of shocks in macro labor
models; see den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) as well as Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright
(2005) and Ramey (2011) for surveys of the literature.
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8.1. Positive Foundations for Bargaining
Our axioms have antecedents in the literature on preplay communication.
Farrell (1987, 1988) allowed players to make cheap-talk announcements before
choosing their payoff-relevant actions. Farrell looked at symmetric equilibria
with the properties that (i) if the announced actions constitute an equilibrium
in the second-stage subgame, then the players will select this action profile in
the second stage; (ii) otherwise, the players will select an arbitrary equilibrium
of the subgame. If one construes Farrell’s condition (i) as “agreement” and
condition (ii) as “disagreement,” then our IAC and PEAC axioms relate to
Farrell’s first assumption, and our NFD axiom relates to his second assump-
tion. Santos (2000) built on Farrell’s approach by structuring the cheap-talk
phase as a bargaining process and showed that inefficient Nash equilibria can
arise if players condition their play in the subgame on the way in which dis-
agreement occurs—a theme continued with our Theorem 1. But only efficient
Nash equilibria arise if the players do not condition on the history of messages
in disagreement (a precursor of NFD).22
As in the preplay communication literature, the positive justification for our
axioms is to allow the players to meaningfully discuss how to play. An axiomatic
approach is necessary, because, as in any cheap-talk model, “babbling” is al-
ways a possibility; that is, the players could simply ignore all communication
and bargaining would be meaningless. Accordingly, our axioms on the mean-
ing of agreement—IAC and PEAC—imply that players mean what they say
when they propose and accept certain kinds of offers.
IAC and PEAC are weaker than renegotiation-proofness axioms in that they
merely make these continuation equilibria available for the players to dis-
cuss, rather than require the players to accept them. Holding aside this differ-
ence, however, IAC and PEAC have direct counterparts in the renegotiation-
proofness literature. Specifically, IAC makes available for discussion any con-
tinuation play that is decomposable on the set of payoffs available at other his-
tories in the same equilibrium, as contemplated by Ray’s (1994) notion of “in-
ternal renegotiation proofness.” It also relates closely to the “internal consis-
tency” notion of Bernheim and Ray (1989) and the “weak renegotiation proof-
ness” notion of Farrell and Maskin (1989).23 Similarly, PEAC makes available
22Watson (1991), Rabin (1994), and Arvan, Cabral, and Santos (1999) also built on Farrell’s
model. Watson (2006) provided a general treatment that embeds bargaining in finite-horizon
games.
23Pearce (1987) critiqued these notions as follows: If the players find themselves in a punish-
ment that is Pareto dominated by play at some other history, but the payoffs obtained at that other
history are supported by the threat of a punishment similar to the one they currently face, then
the idea that they could renegotiate to that other history is a contradiction. Internal consistency
and related notions resolve the contradiction by invalidating the equilibrium, but Pearce (and,
subsequently, Asheim (1991), Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1993), and Bergin and MacLeod
(1993)) resolved the contradiction by invalidating the proposal. We do not mean to take a strong
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for discussion continuation play available in “better” equilibria, where one
equilibrium is “better” than another if the value set of the first fully Pareto
dominates the value set of the second. Since such equilibria are not vulnera-
ble to Pareto-improving deviations back to the current equilibrium, PEAC’s
closest counterpart in the renegotiation-proofness literature is the “stationary
Pareto perfection” notion of Asheim (1991).
A theory of disagreement is necessary because IAC and PEAC alone have no
bite—it does not matter how players interpret agreements if there is no notion
of how they should interpret disagreement. Our theory of disagreement, em-
bodied in the NFD axiom, endows the bargaining phase with a well-defined
disagreement point, which in turn allows the players’ behavior to be inter-
preted in the context of the canonical alternating-offer bargaining paradigm.
This paradigm is positively appealing because its backward induction solution
is sensitive to both bargaining power (derived from the bargaining protocol)
and the disagreement outcome. The backward induction solution also has nor-
mative foundations in static settings, since it is equivalent to the weighted Nash
(1950) bargaining solution.
Still, it is not obvious that NFD is positively appealing in repeated settings:
Would the other players not bear a grudge against, and single out for pun-
ishment, a player who deviates by offering to take a larger share for himself?
We are sympathetic toward this critique. But the critique alone does not iden-
tify what the equilibrium offer should be in the first place. In fact, the cri-
tique leaves open the possibility that even a deviant offer that strictly Pareto
dominates the equilibrium offer could engender a grudge and thereby be dis-
couraged. A more finely tuned “theory of grudges” would indicate what kinds
of deviant offers should engender grudges when bargaining breaks down. De-
pending on the details, such a theory might generate testable predictions that
could distinguish it from NFD.
Our theory of disagreement could be modified to accommodate a limited
notion of grudges without affecting our results. What is important about NFD
is that no offer on the Pareto frontier of either V (s) or V (SCE) should engen-
der a grudge if it also Pareto dominates the disagreement point. If the bar-
gaining phase outcome is to be summarized using the Nash bargaining solu-
tion, a responder considering such an offer must evaluate it with respect to
the same disagreement point that would obtain if he rejected the equilibrium
offer. Other offers can engender grudges without disrupting the equilibrium
bargaining outcome.
Other notions of disagreement are also potentially fruitful. The renego-
tiation-proofness literature, although it does not address the possibility of dis-
philosophical stand on this question. Indeed, imposing merely NFD and a variant of PEAC, with-
out IAC, would yield a coherent theory of equilibrium selection, but one that is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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agreement,24 could be interpreted as imposing the theory that play under dis-
agreement is identical to that under agreement. An alternative way to reconcile
renegotiation proofness with our framework is to impose NFD and one or both
consistency axioms, but allow the players’ relative bargaining power to depend
on the history. Allowing the bargaining weights to vary in arbitrary ways would
enable the players to reach agreement on any point on the Pareto frontier of
C(W ) as long as it Pareto dominated the disagreement point. For instance, the
results of Levin (2003, discussed in Section 7.1) could be reconciled with our
axioms if the agent got to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer in his reward state,
but the principal got to make the offer in the agent’s punishment state. How-
ever, it is our view that bargaining power should be derived from primitives of
the model rather than treated as an aspect of equilibrium selection.
For symmetric games, Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1993) proposed a no-
tion of “consistent bargaining equilibrium” that maximizes the minimum con-
tinuation payoff that any player can receive after any history, rather than im-
posing internal consistency. The bargaining process that generates their theory
can be loosely conceptualized as follows. Each player has veto power over con-
tinuation play; if player i exercises his veto, then they revert to a symmetric
equilibrium of his choice, but starting from whichever history yields player i’s
worst continuation payoff in that equilibrium. This notion violates NFD, since
continuation play following a veto depends on who exercised the veto.25 Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti interpreted veto power as a kind of equal bargaining
power. They cautioned, however, that their notion should not be viewed as a
“definitive solution,” and challenged the literature to generate an “authorita-
tive bargaining theory for the division of surplus in repeated games.” Contrac-
tual equilibrium is our answer to this challenge.
8.2. The Timing of Transfers and Bargaining
In our modeling approach, the players bargain and then make voluntary
transfers at the beginning of each period, and, by the NFD axiom, coordinate
to make no transfers under disagreement. One way to interpret these assump-
tions is that, in reality, the monetary transfer marks the successful resolution of
bargaining: If the agreement involves an immediate transfer—one player writ-
ing a check payable to the other—then it is the signature on the check, rather
than the verbal “yes,” that signifies the successful resolution of bargaining. Fail-
24One exception is Blume (1994), who allowed the players to agree to a plan that involves
Pareto-dominated continuation values in the future. Blume’s approach gives the players surplus
to bargain over, but does not model bargaining power or investigate its implications. In principle,
Blume’s formal structure leaves open the possibility of modeling bargaining power by imposing
axioms on the bargaining operator he defined.
25It is unclear how to resolve coordination problems that would arise when either multiple
players wish to veto or each player would prefer that other players exercise their vetoes.
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ing to write the check implies disagreement. In this sense, the bargaining phase
encompasses the transfer choices.26
Still, it could be interesting to consider variations on the timing of trans-
fers and bargaining within a period. In the renegotiation-proofness literature,
Baliga and Evans (2000) studied transfers that occur simultaneously with ac-
tions, while GK and Fong and Surti (2009) studied transfers that occur in a
separate phase. In the context of contractual equilibrium, consider what could
happen after a player reneges on an agreed-upon transfer. If there is no bar-
gaining between the transfer and action phases, the players’ continuation value
may be any point in D(W ), the set of payoffs attainable from the action phase.
In contrast, if there is an additional bargaining phase before the action phase,
then the players should agree to continuation play on the Pareto frontier of
D(W ). Depending on the stage game and the discount factor, this additional
constraint may or may not restrict the set of attainable payoffs, as shown by
GK.
Finally, what if there were no transfer phase between the bargaining and ac-
tion phases, for example, if all transfers occurred simultaneously with actions?
Contractual equilibrium would still constitute a coherent theory of equilib-
rium selection, but one would have to specify whether disagreement implies
any restriction on how players coordinate their play in the action phase (such
as no transfers). Without such a restriction, the C and D operators would be
identical, so given any contractual equilibrium, one could always modify play
under disagreement to be identical to play under agreement. There would
be no surplus to bargain over, so bargaining power would play no role. The
implications of contractual equilibrium would be similar to those of “consis-
tent” equilibrium (Bernheim and Ray (1989)). In our model, surplus arises
from the fact that the Pareto frontier is higher under agreement than under
disagreement. For the study of relational contracts, we argue that transfers
and productive actions are most appropriately modeled in separate phases,
and that forcing them to occur simultaneously constitutes a knife-edge special
case.
8.3. Experimental Connections
The experimental setting presents a good opportunity to develop intuition
and test the predictions of contractual equilibrium against other theories. We
are not aware of experiments on recurrent bargaining in infinitely repeated
games. However, some experimental work on preplay communication and co-
ordination relates to key elements of our theory.
Experiments on preplay communication suggest that players use messages
to coordinate their behavior, and that the protocol by which they communi-
26Checks require a minimal degree of external enforcement. Our approach readily generalizes
to settings in which other types of contractual clauses may also be externally enforceable.
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cate imparts a measure of bargaining power. For example, Cooper, DeJong,
Forsythe, and Ross (1989, 1992) compared games with one-way and two-way
communication. With one-way communication, the sender typically announces
his preferred equilibrium of the underlying game and the players typically play
this equilibrium. With simultaneous two-way communication, outcomes are
more symmetric, but the players often fail to coordinate. Allowing multiple
rounds of simultaneous messages reduces the incidence of coordination fail-
ure.27
Cooper and Kühn (2013) provided provocative evidence on communication,
coordination, and renegotiation in games. Cooper and Kühn conducted two-
period experiments and studied the effect of allowing or disallowing commu-
nication between periods. Cooperation in the first period is more frequent
when a player has threatened to use second-period play to punish a cheater
(by coordinating on a Pareto-dominated equilibrium), suggesting that players
use preplay communication to coordinate. Moreover, when players can com-
municate between periods, they often renegotiate away from punishments to
select a Pareto-dominant equilibrium in the second period, as would be pre-
dicted by both our theory and renegotiation proofness. Nonetheless, cooper-
ation in the first period is even higher with between-period communication.
Players take the opportunity between periods to admonish one another (some-
times aggressively) for cheating in the first period. Cooper and Kühn inter-
preted these admonishments as nonpecuniary punishments that may be less
costly to the admonisher than punishing via actions in the second-period stage
game.
Clear distinctions between contractual equilibrium and renegotiation proof-
ness do not arise in the results of Cooper and Kühn, because their experimental
design does not allow for monetary transfers, variations in relative bargaining
power, or variations in stage-game payoffs.28 However, we can suggest a re-
lated experiment to test the distinct predictions of contractual equilibrium. We
propose an experiment with the following features: (i) the players can make
voluntary transfers between the two periods; (ii) the second-period coordina-
tion game has a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, but also has asymmetric
Pareto-dominated equilibria; (iii) communication between periods follows a
specific bargaining protocol.29 Varying the equilibrium payoffs of the coordi-
nation game would produce different disagreement values and surpluses. By
27See Crawford (1998) for a description of this and other cheap-talk experiments.
28Sloof and Sonnemans (2011) studied the Schmidt and Schnitzer model with communica-
tion and transfers. However, the experimental design focuses on technology choice rather than
bargaining, and so does not separate the Schmidt and Schnitzer model from standard subgame-
perfection analysis.
29Players might engage in less verbal admonishment when they have access to monetary trans-
fers as an even cheaper punishment instrument, in addition to multiple equilibria to use as dis-
agreement points.
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varying the bargaining protocol, one could look at different degrees of rela-
tive bargaining power. Contractual equilibrium predicts that these variations
should matter for supporting cooperation in the first period. It may also be
useful to have noisy play in the first period, so that it is not known whether
deviations from an agreement were intentional.
9. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces contractual equilibrium, a new approach to equilib-
rium selection in repeated games that is based on communication with endoge-
nous meaning. Contractual equilibrium allows disagreement play and bargain-
ing power to arise endogenously, in a way consistent with a well-defined ex-
tensive form. Contractual equilibrium exists, yields a unique welfare level, is
tractable in applications, and extends easily to games with imperfect monitor-
ing and heterogeneous discount factors.
The underlying principles of contractual equilibrium are not restricted to re-
peated games with transfers. In dynamic games, where a payoff-relevant state
can vary over time and shift endogenously in response to players’ actions, the
same notions of agreement and disagreement apply. Endogenous disagree-
ment can be particularly powerful in a dynamic setting, since the actions taken
under disagreement can change the set of feasible continuation values.30 Fi-
nally, it would be interesting to consider how disagreement play might depend
on which coalitions manage to cohere when the grand coalition fails to agree.
We view all of these extensions as promising areas for further research.
Since the noncooperative solution of the generalized alternating-offer bar-
gaining game under our axioms is expressed in terms of bargaining power, it
yields the same outcome as the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Hence
the same conclusions would arise from a hybrid model in which the noncoop-
erative bargaining and transfer phases are replaced with a cooperative Nash
bargaining phase.31
30The legal environment—the set of enforceable contracts and the enforcement technology—
can introduce dynamics if long-term contracts are enforceable. Then the players’ signatures on
the contract, though they have no effect on the feasibility of the equilibrium path since the con-
tract can always be renegotiated, can leverage the threat of enforcement to change the feasible
set of continuation values after future disagreements.
31There is a tradition of incorporating cooperative bargaining into otherwise noncooperative
games to model bargaining power. One example is the macroeconomic literature on labor market
search frictions, as discussed in Section 7.3. Another is the holdup theory of the firm originated
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995) and
Ramey and Watson (2002) employed a hybrid approach to relational contracts. Harrington (1989)
and Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) examined the actions that take place leading up to an
agreement, where the agreement yields a contract that terminates the game.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1. No-Bite Theorems
We expand Theorem 1 by invoking a stronger consistency axiom while
proving the same result. Since the players recognize that any payoff in
C(coV (SIAC)) is attainable from the action phase, suppose that any proposal
to play as if switching to a different equilibrium in SIAC is interpreted meaning-
fully.
AXIOM SEAC—Strong External Agreement Consistency: For every history
to the transfer phase under agreement, if the agreement takes the form w ∈
C(coV (SIAC)), then continuation play yields the value w.
Let SSEAC be the subset of SSPE that satisfies SEAC and note that SSEAC ⊆
SIAC. SEAC imposes a strong requirement on continuation play following a
deviant agreement, because it requires the players to follow through even on a
deviant agreement that is Pareto dominated by what they should have agreed
on. However, IAC and SEAC do not constrain the set of attainable payoffs.
THEOREM 1′—IAC and SEAC Have No Bite: We have
V (SIAC)= V (SSEAC)= V (SSPE)

PROOF: Let SNB be the set of equilibria in a repeated game that lacks any
bargaining phase, but is otherwise identical to the game described in Sec-
tion 2.1. Since bargaining is cheap talk and both games have arbitrary public
correlation devices, V (SSPE) = V (SNB). Thus, our task is to prove V (SNB) ⊆
V (SSEAC). We proceed by demonstrating how, for a given period, values in
C(V (SNB)) can be supported from the bargaining phase in a way that is consis-
tent with SEAC. We then construct equilibrium strategies recursively.
Consider any w ∈ C(V (SNB)). By the definition of C, there is a specification
of behavior for the transfer phase and action phase that (i) yields value w from
the transfer phase, (ii) utilizes continuation values from V (SNB) for the follow-
ing period, and (iii) is sequentially rational. We refer below to this specification
as “rational behavior supporting w from the transfer phase.”
For any fixed value in C(V (SNB)), we next describe behavior in the bargain-
ing phase that yields this value. We specify the behavior recursively by round
of the bargaining phase, starting with the first round. Take as given a round of
the bargaining phase and any w ∈ C(V (SNB)). Call w the desired value. Let i
denote the proposer and let j denote the responder. The following provisions
give the prescribed behavior for this round of bargaining.
(i) Prescribe that player i proposes w and player i responds “yes.” If the
players behave in this way, then prescribe rational behavior supporting w from
the transfer phase.
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(ii) Suppose player i proposes w as prescribed, but player j deviates by
responding “no.” If bargaining then breaks down, prescribe rational behavior
supporting w from the transfer phase. Otherwise, let w again be the desired
value for the next round of bargaining.
(iii) Suppose player i deviates by proposing some w′ /∈ C(V (SNB)). If bar-
gaining terminates after player j’s response, either because player j responds
“yes” or because bargaining breaks down, then prescribe rational behavior sup-
porting w from the transfer phase. If bargaining does not terminate, then let w
be the desired value for the next round of bargaining.
(iv) Suppose player i deviates by proposing some w′ ∈ C(V (SNB)). Then
select w′′ ∈ C(V (SNB)) such that w′′i ≤wi and w′′j ≥w′j . (By the characterization
of C given by Eq. (3), w′′ can always be attained by augmenting either w or w′
with a transfer from player i to player j.) Prescribe that player j responds “no”
to the offer w′. If player j instead deviates to respond “yes,” then prescribe
rational behavior supporting w′ from the transfer phase. If player j responds
“no” and bargaining breaks down, then prescribe rational behavior supporting
w′′ from the transfer phase. If player j responds “no” and bargaining continues,
then set the desired value to w′′ for the next round of bargaining.
In some of the cases just described, bargaining continues to another round.
Behavior for the next round is specified in the same fashion, with the new de-
sired value. In this way, we recursively construct a complete specification of
behavior in the bargaining phase, as well as for the transfer phase and the ac-
tion phase. There is an implied mapping from the sequence of actions in the
period to continuation values from the start of the next period.
The specified behavior is sequentially rational. For instance, by proposing
the desired value w, player i expects to get wi. If he deviates, then he gets
either wi or some w′′i ≤ wi, so he prefers to propose w. Note that in the event
that player i proposes some w′ ∈ C(V (SNB)) (even a value satisfying w′j > wj),
player j optimally says “no” because this leads to the value w′′ which player j
prefers to w′.
The specified behavior is also consistent with SEAC. To see this, first note
that the presence of the public randomization phase implies coV (SNB) =
V (SNB). In addition, since SIAC ⊆ SNB, we have that coV (SIAC) ⊆ coV (SNB).
Putting these together and using the fact that C is monotone, we conclude that
C(coV (SIAC))⊆ C(V (SNB)). Thus, any agreement on a value in C(coV (SIAC))
is covered by item (i) or item (iv), which specify behavior that attains the agreed
value.
The construction above shows that all values in C(V (SNB)) can be supported
from the bargaining phase in a way consistent with SEAC, using continuation
values in V (SNB) from the following period. Thus, SEAC does not impose
a constraint on the recursive construction that characterizes SPE continua-
tion values, and V (SSEAC) = V (SNB) = V (SSPE). For each point v ∈ V (SSPE),
an equilibrium strategy profile that attains value v and satisfies SEAC can
be constructed recursively by following the steps outlined above for behavior
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within a period and then over all periods (by tracking the continuation values
required). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: For the first claim of the theorem, we proceed by
characterizing a subset Wˆ ⊂ V (SpsNFD) defined by the additional restriction that,
if a player offers the disagreement value and the other player accepts, then
this value is achieved in the continuation (IAC applied only to w). A variant of
operator C can be used to characterize Wˆ :
Cˆ(W ) ≡ {w ∈R2 ∣∣(20)
∃m ∈R20 and ww′ ∈D(W )
s.t. w= (1 − δ)m+w′ and w≥w}

Note that Cˆ(W )⊆ C(W ) because D(W )⊆D(W ).
Given that continuation values in W are available in the future, a pay-
off w is available in the present if there exists a transfer m, a disagreement
point w ∈D(W ), and an action-phase continuation value w′ ∈D(W ) such that
w = (1 − δ)m + w′ and w ≥ w. This works because in this class of equilibria,
each player i can guarantee himself a payoff of at least wi by always offer-
ing w as the proposer and always saying “no” as the responder. If w Pareto
dominates w, then the transfer is incentive compatible because it makes both
players better off than under disagreement. Since w′ ∈ D(W ), the actions are
incentive compatible as well.
Standard arguments establish that the sets of interest are compact, and pub-
lic randomization allows us to focus on convex sets. Let W ⊂ R2 be any com-
pact and convex set. Operators C and Cˆ share a useful property: The Pareto
frontiers of C(W ) and Cˆ(W ) are subsets of a line segment with slope −1.
In fact, they have the same extremal values. To see this, suppose that w is
the point that minimizes player 1’s value among points in P(C(W )), so that
w1 = minD1(W ). There is then a point w ∈D(W ) such that w1 =w1. Further-
more, it must be that w2 ≤ w2, for otherwise w would not be on the Pareto
frontier of C(W ). This implies that w ∈ Cˆ(W ) as well. The same logic applies
to the other extremal point. Since Cˆ(W ) ⊂ C(W ), the extrema coincide. We
thus have that P(coC(W )) = P(co Cˆ(W )). It is also clear that each player’s
greatest and least values in coC(W ) and co Cˆ(W ) are found on the Pareto
frontiers of these sets.
With these facts in mind, we can restrict attention to sets W that have the
same properties, since our objects of interest are the fixed points of coC(·)
and co Cˆ(·). With pure strategies, for any history to the action phase, the play-
ers will be coordinating on a pure action profile. It is sufficient to punish a
unilateral deviation by selecting a continuation value that is worst for the de-
viating player. Furthermore, to find the maximal joint continuation value from
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the action phase, on the equilibrium path, the continuation value from the next
period will be on the Pareto frontier of the set of continuation values. Thus, if
W is the set of continuation values from the next period, then, in reference to
Eq. (1), it is sufficient to have g map to three points on the frontier line seg-
ment, including the two endpoints. An implication of these observations is that
P(coC(W )) and P(co Cˆ(W )) depend only on the Pareto frontier of W . Thus,
P(V (S
ps
SPE)) is itself a fixed point of coC(·) and also of co Cˆ(·), which implies
the first claim of the theorem.
For the second claim, observe that any subgame-perfect equilibrium value
obtained without transfers can be obtained under NFD if the players ignore
the bargaining phase entirely. Q.E.D.
A.2. Representation
Theorem 3 is proven by the following five lemmas.
LEMMA 6: Consider an isolated noncooperative bargaining game with recog-
nition process ρ, breakdown process β, default payoff w, and bargaining set
{w ∈ R2|w1 +w2 ≤ K} for some k ∈ R satisfying K ≥ w1 +w2. In any subgame-
perfect equilibrium, with probability 1, each player i earns a payoff of wi +πi(K−





The proof follows from generalizing the recursive methods of Shaked and
Sutton (1984), using our assumption that
∏∞
=1(1 −β)= 0.
For the rest of the proof, fix πi =∑∞=1 ρiβ∏−1k=1(1−βk). Given a BSG set,
we next construct a subgame-perfect equilibrium that attains a value in this set
while satisfying IAC and NFD.
LEMMA 7: Let W be a BSG set and select any payoff vector v ∈ W . Inputting
(vW ) into the recursive construction algorithm in Figure 5 yields a subgame-
perfect equilibrium s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD that attains an expected payoff of v.
PROOF: Note that the algorithm recursively constructs function vˆ :H→ W
along with the strategy profile s, starting with the null history, then one-
period histories, and so on. In line 5 of Figure 5, μ exists because v ∈
coB(C(W )D(W )), which follows from W being a BSG set. In line 7, w exists
by definition of B. In line 8, bargaining ends in agreement on payoff w by con-
struction of w and Lemma 6. In line 11, m∗ and w∗ exist by definition of C. In
line 19, if the test condition is satisfied for i = j, then it is violated for i = −j.
In line 20, w∗ exists because w′ ∈C(W ) satisfies w′ ∈D(W ) by definition of C.
In line 21, since w∗ ∈D(W ), α∗ and g∗ exist by definition of D. Therefore, the
algorithm is well-defined.
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Input: W a BSG set and v ∈W .
Output: s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD such that v ∈ V (s).
INITIALIZATION:
let vˆ(∅)= v;
let Ω= B(C(W )D(W ));
for t = 1 to ∞ do
foreach h ∈ (Ω× B×R+ ×R+ ×A)t−1 do
PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION:
5 let μ ∈ Ω solve ∫
w∈Ω wdμ= vˆ(h);
6 play public randomization μ, resulting in realization w;
BARGAINING PHASE:
7 let w ∈D(W ) solve w ∈ B(C(W ) {w});
8 play a subgame perfect equilibrium in an isolated noncooperative
bargaining game with recognition process ρ, breakdown process β,
bargaining set C(W ), and default payoff w;
TRANSFER PHASE:
foreach b ∈ B do
10 if b ends in agreement on a payoff w′ ∈ C(W ) then
11 let (m∗w∗) ∈R20 ×D(W ) solve (1 − δ)m∗ +w∗ =w′;
else
13 let m∗ = (00) and w∗ =w;
let mˆ∗ = (−min{0m∗1}−min{0m∗2});
play transfer mˆ∗;
ACTION PHASE:
16 foreach mˆ ∈R2+ do
17 if b ends in agreement on a payoff w′ ∈ C(W ) then
foreach i ∈ {12} do
19 if mˆi < mˆ∗i and mˆ−i = mˆ∗−i then
20 let w∗ ∈D(W ) solve w∗i ≤w′i;
21 let α∗ ∈ ˆA and g∗ :A→W solve (1 − δ)u(α∗)+ δg∗(α∗)=w∗
subject to α∗ is a Nash equilibrium in the game
〈A (1 − δ)u+ δg∗〉;
play mixed action α∗;
foreach a ∈A do
let vˆ(hμb mˆa)= g∗(a);
FIGURE 5.—Recursive construction algorithm.
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Collecting the output of all the play statements yields a well-defined strategy
profile (where line 6 is a move of Nature), since every history is accounted for.
By construction, this equilibrium is subgame-perfect, since it calls for sequen-
tially rational actions in every bargaining phase (by Lemma 6), sequentially
rational transfers in every transfer phase (by lines 10–13 and 16–20), and se-
quentially rational mixed actions in every action phase (by line 21).
Axiom NFD is satisfied by line 13, which sets all disagreements to yield the
same disagreement payoff w. Axiom IAC is satisfied by lines 10–11 and 17–20,
which ensure that any agreement payoff w′ ∈ C(W ) with w′ ∈D(W ) is imple-
mented. Therefore, if W is a BSG set and v ∈W , the output is a strategy profile
s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD. The equilibrium payoff is v ∈ V (s) by construction. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 8: If s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD, then coV (s) is a BSG set.
PROOF: Since s ∈ SNFD, every bargaining phase has a well-defined dis-
agreement payoff. Since s ∈ SIAC, every proposal w ∈ C(coV (s)), if accepted,
leads to continuation payoff w. Standard recursive techniques for character-
izing equilibrium continuation values in bargaining games (for instance, re-
lating the proposer’s supremum values in one round to the players’ supre-
mum continuation values from the next round) establish that the bargaining
phase has a unique equilibrium outcome and that it has the same represen-
tation as in Lemma 6. Further, coV (s) must have a closed Pareto boundary;
otherwise existence is violated in the bargaining phase. By sequential ratio-
nality, the disagreement payoff w after any history satisfies w ∈ D(V (s)) ⊆
D(coV (s)). Thus the equilibrium payoff from the bargaining phase is w ∈
B(C(coV (s))D(coV (s))), so every continuation value from the start of a
period satisfies v ∈ coB(C(coV (s))D(coV (s))). Hence coV (s) is a BSG
set. Q.E.D.
For the following two lemmas, let W ∗ be the dominant BSG set.
LEMMA 9: Inputting W ∗ and any v ∈ W ∗ into the recursive construction algo-
rithm of Figure 5 yields a strategy profile s∗ ∈ SPEAC such that v ∈ V (s∗).
PROOF: By definition, W ∗ fully Pareto dominates every BSG set. By
Lemma 8, therefore, W ∗ fully Pareto dominates V (s) for every equilibrium
s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD. Since W ∗ is also a BSG set, every v ∈ W ∗ is available in
each bargaining phase. Since the recursive construction algorithm always pro-
duces an equilibrium s ∈ SIAC ∩ SNFD, with input W ∗ it produces an equilibrium
s∗ ∈ SPEAC. Q.E.D.
LEMMA 10: If s∗ ∈ SPEAC, then V (s∗)⊆W ∗.
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PROOF: By Lemma 8, coV (s∗) is a BSG set. By PEAC and Lemma 9, every
payoff in W ∗ is in the bargaining set of every bargaining phase. By sequential
rationality, therefore, no v ∈ V (s∗) can be strictly Pareto dominated by any
v′ ∈ W ∗. This implies that if W ∗ fully Pareto dominates V (s∗), then it must be
that V (s∗)⊆W ∗. Finally, since W ∗ = coW ∗, we have coV (s∗)⊆W ∗. Q.E.D.
A.3. Existence and Construction
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: By construction of B, for any set W , the ele-
ments of B(C(W )D(W )) are on a line of slope −1, so coB(C(W )D(W ))
is a line segment of slope −1. That W ⊆ B(C(W )D(W )) implies that
W ⊆ V (SSPE), wherein each v ∈ V (SSPE) is bounded above by v1 + v2 ≤
maxα∈ˆA(u1(α)+u2(α)) and bounded below by vi ≥ minα−i∈A−i maxαi∈Ai ui(α)
for each i. Q.E.D.
The following lemma establishes some basic properties of B, C, and D. Else-
where we take these properties for granted without reference to this lemma.
LEMMA 11: (i) W nonempty ⇒ D(W ) nonempty ⇒ C(W ) nonempty. (ii) W
compact⇒D(W ) compact⇒ C(W ) closed. (iii) P(W ) a nonempty line segment
of slope −1 and W nonempty with P(W ∪W )= P(W ) ⇒ B(W W ) nonempty;
(iv) W also compact ⇒ B(W W ) compact ⇒ coB(W W ) compact.
The results in Lemma 11 follow from the definitions of B, C, and D, the fact
that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous, and the
fact that every stage-game Nash equilibrium is enforced by a constant contin-
uation value function.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: Since W is a closed BSG set and z2 is the end-
point that most favors player 1, z21 is the maximum payoff for player 1 that
can be supported utilizing continuation values from W associated with the
next period, that is, z21 = max{v1|v ∈ B(C(W )D(W ))}. Because elements in
B(C(W )D(W )) correspond to various disagreement points in D(W ), this
maximization problem can be expressed using the bargaining solution (Eq. (4)
with C(W ) in place of W ), taking the disagreement point as the choice vari-
able. Since level(W ) = maxw∈C(W )(w1 + w2) for any given disagreement point





π2w1 −π1w2 +π1 level(W )
)
(21)
s.t. w= (1 − δ)u(α)+ δg(α) and g :A→W enforces α

We next rewrite the optimization problem with a change of variables. Define
η(a)≡ g1(a)− z21 for every a. Because the welfare level of every point in W is
level(W ), we have g2(a)= z22 −η(a). Also, the constraint that g(a) ∈ co{z1 z2}
is equivalent to the requirement that η(a) ∈ [z11 − z210]. Using η to substitute
2346 D. A. MILLER AND J. WATSON









η :A→ [z11 − z210] extended to ˆA
α ∈ ˆA is a Nash equilibrium
of
〈A (1 − δ)u+ δ(η−η)+ δz2〉

In the objective function on the right, we substitute for z22 using the equality
z21 + z22 = level(W ). Combining terms and moving the constant δz21 to the left
side yields
z21 = π1 level(W )+ max
ηα
(
π2u1(α)−π1u2(α)+ δ1 − δη(α)
)
(23)
subject to the conditions above. Recalling the definition of γ2, we have the
conclusion of the lemma. Analyzing endpoint z1 in the same way gives the
similar expression for z12 .
The optimum defining γi exists for each i because the stage game is fi-
nite, the set of feasible η functions is compact, and the Nash correspon-
dence is upper hemicontinuous. Regarding the final claim of the lemma, let
αNE be a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. Note that αNE and η ≡ 0 sat-
isfy the conditions of the maximization problems that define γ1 and γ2, so
γ2(d) ≥ π2u1(αNE) − π1u2(αNE) and γ1(d) ≥ π1u2(αNE) − π2u1(αNE). Sum-
ming, we have that γ2(d)+ γ1(d)≥ 0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Let z1 and z2 denote the endpoints of W , and let z′1
and z′2 denote the endpoints of W ′. Suppose that span(W ) ≥ span(W ′). The
larger span of W can support weakly more mixed actions in the stage game
as equilibria than W ′ can, because it provides a greater range of continua-
tion values. This comparison does not depend on the location of the endpoints
or the levels of the two sets (which are mere constants in the players’ pay-
offs), only their relative spans. Thus any mixed action that can be supported by
W ′ can also be supported by W , so level(W ) ≥ level(W ′). Furthermore, since
each γj(d) is increasing in d, Lemma 2 and the larger span of W imply that
z
j
i ≥ z′ji for each i = j, which suffices to establish that W fully Pareto domi-
nates W ′. Q.E.D.
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